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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 930513-CA 
V. : 
DONALD EUGENE LEWIS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of 
unlawful taking of protected wildlife, class A misdemeanors, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (1991), two counts of waste 
of protected wildlife, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § -23-20-8 (1991), two counts of aiding or assisting 
another in the unlawful possession of protected wildlife, class A 
misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-23 (1991), 
and two counts of aiding or assisting another in the waste of 
protected wildlife, class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 23-20-23 (1991), in the Sixth Judicial District Court 
in and for Kane County, State of Utah, the Honorable David L. 
Mower, presiding. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994), 
generally, provides for this Court's jurisdiction in a case of 
this type; however, the circumstances of the case indicate that 
the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal? The trial court had no occasion to address this 
question, which must therefore be addressed in the first instance 
by this Court. 
2. Did defendant waive his right to appeal by 
deliberately refusing to appear for trial and sentencing? The 
trial court had no occasion to address this question, which must 
therefore be addressed in the first instance by this Court. 
3. Did defendant invite error by knowingly choosing 
not to appear for trial following notice and then claiming on 
appeal that he did not waive his right to assistance of counsel 
at trial? Whether defendant has invited error is, by its nature, 
a question which must be addressed in the first instance on 
appeal. Also, because defendant was not present at trial and the 
issue of waiver of right of counsel was not brought to the trial 
court's attention, the issue is one which must be addressed in 
the first instance by this Court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are set out in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was first charged by information, in case no. 
91-CR-0071, with two counts of unlawful taking of protected 
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wildlife, class A misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 23-20-4 (1991), and two counts of waste of protected wildlife, 
class B misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-8 
(1991) (R. 170-72) . To defend against those charges, defendant 
retained R. Clayton Huntsman on November 26, 1991 (R. 168-69) . 
The same day defendant was released on $5,000 bail (R. 173-74). 
Defendant was then charged by amended information with 
additional offenses, i.e. two counts of aiding and assisting in 
the taking of protected wildlife, class A misdemeanors, and two 
counts of aiding and assisting in the waste of protected 
wildlife, class B misdemeanors, all in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 23-20-23 (1991) (R. 153-56). 
Defendant moved to sever the newly charged offenses 
from those first charged (R. 151-52), and the trial court granted 
the motion (R. 149-50). A new case number was assigned (see 
minute entry of January 17, 1992, R. 148), and defendant retained 
Brian R. Florence in case no. 9216000031 and as lead counsel in 
both cases (R. 69, 76).2 
On September 2, 1992, the prosecution moved to 
consolidate the two cases (R. 56-57). 
On October 19, 1992, Florence moved to withdraw as 
1
 The order of severance clearly suggests that case no. 
921600003 came to embrace the four counts of aiding and assisting 
(R. 149-50) . 
2
 Although the trial court's minute entry indicates that 
Florence represented that he was acting as lead counsel in both 
cases, Florence did not formally enter his appearance in case no. 
9-CR-0071 until six months later (R. 146-47). 
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defense counsel from both cases because defendant was unwilling 
to pay him sufficiently to try the matters (Motion to Withdraw as 
Counsel, R. 50-52, attached at Addendum B). The motion also 
stated that "defendant is aware that [Florence] intends to make 
this request and that [defendant] would be responsible for 
appearing with counsel or by himself at any future trial setting" 
(R. 51). A copy of the motion was sent to defendant on October 
21. (R. 52). 
On October 21, Huntsman also filed a motion to withdraw 
from case no. 91-CR-0071, not only because defendant was 
"unwilling to pay the necessary attorney fee to try this case and 
its potentially joined case, No. 921600003," but also because 
"[d]efendant has otherwise not cooperated with counsel, making 
counsel's attempt to adequately defend much more difficult and 
essentially impractical" (Motion for Order Authorizing Withdrawal 
of Counsel, R. 86-87, attached at Addendum B). Huntsman sent a 
copy of the request only to Florence and to the state's attorney 
(R. 88). However, the motion also stated that "[d]efendant has 
been advised often over the past year of this request and 
understands that he is responsible for appearing at any future 
trial, with or without counsel" (R. 87). 
Each of defendant's counsel's motion to withdraw stated 
that trial in case no. 91-CR-0071 was set for December 21 through 
December 23. Eight days later, on October 29, the prosecutor 
sent defendant a notice to substitute counsel, referencing both 
cases by number, advising defendant that both his attorneys had 
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withdrawn and that he must substitute counsel within twenty days 
(Notice to Substitute Counsel, R. 4 8-49, attached at Addendum C). 
At this time, the State's motion to consolidate the two cases for 
trial was pending (R. 50, 56-57). 
On November 20, 1992, the trial court consolidated the 
two cases under case number 91-CR-0071 (see Order, R. 32-34; 47). 
Defendant was not present at the proceeding, but was represented 
by Huntsman (R. 32, 47). The Court also granted Florence's and 
Huntsman's requests to withdraw as counsel (R. 33, 47). 
On December 17, the court mailed a copy of the order to 
defendant (R. 34). In addition to alerting defendant to the fact 
that both his attorneys were no longer representing him, the 
order notified defendant that a non-jury trial would be set for 
December 21 ,{R. 32-33) . The trial court had previously sent 
defendant a notice, on or about November 23, referring to both 
cases, that he or his counsel must appear at a December 4 
scheduling conference to consider his jury demand (R. 46). The 
prosecutor also sent a similar notice to defendant on November 25 
(Notice of Scheduling Conference, R. 44-45, attached at Addendum 
E), but defendant did not appear (R. 43). On December 8, the 
prosecutor sent defendant a notice of non-jury trial, informing 
defendant of the time and place of trial and that his appearance 
was required (Notice of Non-Jury Trial, R. 41-42, attached at 
Addendum F). 
Defendant failed to appear at trial on December 21, 
1992, and defense counsel was also not present. The following 
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colloquy took place between the trial court and the prosecutor: 
THE COURT: When we look at the file, I 
think there have been notices sent to him and 
his lawyers and I think you've sent most of 
those, haven't you? 
MR. SCARTH [Prosecutor]: Yeah. I don't 
mean to be facetious, but for months we've 
been sending notices of the trial on this 
day, originally that it would be a jury trial 
on this date at the "a.m." and then, more 
recently, that it would be--[inaudible]. 
THE COURT: None of those ever came back 
from the Post Office? 
MR. SCARTH: None have ever been 
returned. 
THE COURT: But you've never had any 
affirmative reaction from Mr. Lewis that he 
ever got anything from you. 
MR. SCARTH: That's right. I've sent 
him not only notices of the trial, but notice 
of the substitute counsel, various orders 
prior to being signed, for his review, after 
being signed by the Court. We've sent him 
copies. We've received no reaction from him 
since--well, I've never heard from Mr. Lewis, 
ever. Neither has anyone on my staff. 
THE COURT: He had two lawyers at one 
time and they both sent him a notice to 
appoint counsel. 
MR. SCARTH: Correct. Through his 
attorneys, of course, I've heard from him. 
But only through his former attorneys. 
They've now both withdrawn. 
THE COURT: . . . Well, I'm satisfied 
that Mr. Lewis knows about these proceedings 
today and has voluntarily chosen not to 
appear and the motion, by the State, to 
proceed in the absence of Mr. Lewis is 
granted . . . . 
(Trial Transcript, "TT." 4-6, attached "at Addendum G). 
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The trial proceeded and the court found defendant 
guilty on all counts (Judgment, R. 18-19, attached at Addendum 
H). The court sent a copy of the judgment to defendant on 
January 19, 1993, informing him of his conviction and requiring 
him to appear for a sentencing hearing on January 22 (R. 19). 
Previously, on January 6, the prosecutor had sent defendant a 
notice informing defendant of the time and place of sentencing 
and that his presence was required (R. 23-24). The prosecutor had 
also sent defendant a notice of forfeiture on January 11 advising 
him that his presence was required for the January 22nd 
forfeiture hearing (R. 20-22). 
Defendant failed to appear for his sentencing hearing on 
January 22 (R. 17). Again, the trial court and prosecutor 
discussed defendant's non-appearance: 
THE COURT: . . . Today's the day for 
sentencing. 
Donald E. Lewis, with you [sic] are you 
here? 
[NO RESPONSE] 
. . . Any reason not to have the 
sentencing hearing now, Mr. Scarth? 
MR. SCARTH: None, Your Honor. I 
believe the defendant has received adequate 
notice. My office mailed him notice some 
time back. 
The judgment itself, which was dated by 
this Court on the 14th of January, 1993, the 
last sentence says "Sentencing in this matter 
will commence on January 22nd, 1993, at 9:00 
a.m. in Kanab, Utah. The defendant's 
presence at sentencing is required." 
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Now that wasn't mailed to Mr. Lewis 
until the 19th day of January, 1993; however, 
prior to mailing it to the court, some four 
or five days prior to the 19th--what I'm 
saying is five days prior to that, we mailed 
Mr. Lewis a letter with a proposed order, 
telling him if he had any objection, let me 
know in five days. I never heard from him. 
It was also about that same time frame 
that we sent him a notice to appear here--
specifically to appear for sentencing at this 
time, place, and date. 
THE COURT: It's the same address that 
you've sent other papers to. 
MR. SCARTH: That's correct. And 
nothing's come back undelivered. 
THE COURT: Today's the day for the 
sentencing. I don't see a reason not to hold 
a sentencing today. 
(Sentencing Transcript, "ST." 3-4, attached at Addendum J). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of four 
years in the"Kane County Jail on all of the four class A 
misdemeanor convictions, and to a term of two years on all of the 
four class B misdemeanor convictions, suspending all except for 
two years. Another judgment was signed on February 19 and 
entered and mailed to defendant on February 22 (Judgment, 
Sentence and Order of Forfeiture, R. 6-9, attached at Addendum 
K). Also on February 19, 1993, the trial court issued a warrant 
for defendant's arrest, setting bail at $20,000.00 (R. 10). 
Subsequently defendant was arrested in Alabama. 
On July 15, 1993, the trial court modified defendant's 
sentence, suspending execution of all but 60 days of jail time 
and placing defendant on probation (R. 182-83). Defendant was 
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present with counsel, Gary Pendleton and David Belser (R. 2, 182-
83). Defendant filed a notice of appeal on August 13, 1993 
(R. 1) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A statement of the facts relating to the offenses for 
which defendant was convicted is unnecessary to resolve the 
issues on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Because defendant's notice of appeal was filed more 
than seven months after the entry of the judgment, defendant's 
appeal is out-of-time. This Court does not have jurisdiction 
over an out-of-time appeal. Therefore, the appeal should be 
dismissed. Defendant's remedy, if any, is to file a petition for 
post-conviction relief under rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in the sentencing court, seeking to be resentenced 
nunc pro tunc, and to then file a timely notice of appeal. 
POINT II 
Although rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
states that the trial court shall inform a defendant of his right 
of appeal and the time period in which the right must be 
exercised, defendant prevented the trial court from fulfilling 
that duty by his disregard of, and absence from, the trial and 
sentencing proceedings, following notice. Defendant knew that 
his presence was required at these proceedings. By flouting the 
authority of the trial court, defendant demonstrated his lack of 
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intention to affect the outcome of the proceedings and thereby 
effectively waived his right of appeal. To consider defendant's 
claim that the trial court erred in failing to inform him of his 
right of appeal would be to sanction a procedure that invites 
error. 
All authority cited by defendant is irrelevant because 
the appellants in those cases appeared before the trial court, 
which failed to inform them of their appeal rights, a 
circumstance radically different from that in this case. Also, 
that authority uses a stricter standard for trial court 
compliance than Utah does. 
Contrary to foreign authority cited by defendant, the 
time for filing the notice of appeal in Utah begins with the 
entry of the judgment, not with the point at which the trial 
court informs the defendant of his right of appeal. 
POINT III 
Defendant invited error by deliberately absenting 
himself from the proceedings, knowing that he was expected to 
appear, and then raising a claim that he was denied assistance of 
counsel at trial. Therefore, this Court should decline to 
consider defendant's claim on the merits. In any event, 
defendant did waive his right to assistance of counsel by 
deliberately absenting himself from the proceedings because he 
knew his counsel had withdrawn and was aware that he was thereby 




THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
AN OUT-OF-TIME APPEAL 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on August 13, 1993 
(R. 1) , almost six months after the entry of the judgment (R. 1). 
Recognizing that the notice of appeal had been untimely filed, 
this Court requested that both defendant and the State submit 
memoranda explaining why the appeal should or should not be 
summarily dismissed. After the memoranda had been submitted, 
this Court ruled that because defendant had not filed any post-
conviction motions, which might have effectively extended the 
period for filing the notice of appeal, the notice of appeal was 
not timely filed from the February 22, 1993 order. However, the 
Court also ruled that the notice of appeal was timely filed from 
the modified sentencing order and limited the appeal to issues 
arising out of that modification (see Order of October 27, 1993). 
Defendant took issue with the Court's apparent failure 
to even acknowledge the substance of his argument or to recognize 
that the issues raised on appeal had nothing to do with the 
modified sentencing order (see defendant's letter of November 4, 
1993) . In apparent response, this Court issued an order vacating 
its October 27th order and deferred consideration of the issues 
raised pending plenary presentation of the case on appeal (see 
Order of November 15, 1993). 
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides 
that "the notice of appeal . . . shall be filed with the clerk of 
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the trial court within 3 0 days after the date of entry of 
judgment . . . ." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This Court's rules 
preclude it from extending the time for filing the notice of 
appeal required by rule 4(a). See Utah R. App. P. 2 and 
22(b)(2). Therefore, if a defendant files an untimely notice of 
appeal, the appellate court does not have jurisdiction over the 
appeal. See State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521, 522-23 (Utah App. 
1989) (per curiam) (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
appeal as of right when the defendant's notice of appeal is 
untimely and the defendant failed to file a Rule 4(e) motion to 
extend). 
Defendant apparently argues that because the trial 
court did not inform him of his right to appeal and the thirty-
day time period within which his appeal must be filed, his notice 
of appeal was timely filed. Appellant's Br. at Point I. While 
defendant's argument as to the trial court's duty may deserve 
consideration, he misapprehends the jurisdictional impediment 
posed by the appellate rules and caselaw in bringing his claims 
before this Court. 
In State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), the 
defendant also failed to timely file a notice of appeal. The 
court noted that the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal 
in a criminal case is jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by an 
appellate court. Id. at 37. Therefore, this Court held: "Out-
of-time appeals must be dismissed." Id. Recognizing, however, a 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to a timely appeal, the 
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Court noted that a defendant could establish the denial of the 
right by moving for relief under rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in the sentencing court. The sentencing court could 
take evidence and sentence the defendant nunc pro tunc, from 
which sentence the defendant could take a timely appeal. Id. 
Accord State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 n.2 (Utah 1993). 
In this case also, defendant's remedy, if any, lies in 
filing a petition for post-conviction relief under rule 65B. 
However, because defendant failed to both file in the trial court 
a timely notice of appeal or a post-conviction motion which might 
have extended the time for filing a notice of appeal, defendant's 
appeal is out-of-time and cannot be considered by this Court. 
Therefore, defendant's appeal must be dismissed. 
Even though defendant also effectively acknowledges 
that his remedy is through a rule 65B petition for post-
conviction relief, see Appellant's Br. at 8 n.2., the State 
addresses the merits of defendant's claim that the trial court 
erred in failing to inform him of his right to appeal. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL BY 
DISREGARDING THE TRIAL AND SENTENCING 
PROCEEDINGS AFTER REPEATED NOTICE 
Rule 22(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides 
that "[f]ollowing imposition of sentence, the court shall advise 
the defendant of his right to appeal and the time within which 
any appeal shall be filed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c). However, 
the rule does not contemplate the circumstance in which a 
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defendant deliberately refuses to attend the proceedings or 
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 
1. Defendant's Voluntary Absence 
from the Proceedings Prevented 
the Court from Informing Him 
of his Appeal Rights. 
In State v. Mvers, 29 Utah 2d 301, 508 P.2d 1178 (Utah 
1973), the defendant's appointed counsel appeared on the first 
day of trial, but not on the second. The defendant, out on bail, 
did not appear at all and was convicted. On appeal the defendant 
argued that he had been deprived of his constitutional right of 
counsel. The Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant could 
hardly assert the right "when he . . . flouted the authority of 
the court by his absence . . . ." Id. 29 Utah 2d at 303, 508 
P.2d at 1179. The court also noted that Myers, counsel in his 
own right, could not realistically argue prejudice "without 
succumbing to a charge of unassertable invited error." Id. 
Similarly, in State v. Ross, 655 P.2d 641 (Utah 1982) 
(per curiam), the defendant absconded from the state while on 
bail before his second trial and resisted extradition. The 
defendant was convicted on all counts following a trial in 
absentia. On appeal Ross argued that the State had failed to 
prove that his absence was voluntary and that in being tried in 
absentia he had been deprived of his constitutional right of due 
process. The supreme court affirmed the convictions, holding 
that any failure of the State to establish voluntariness or 
waiver of consent was obviated by defendant's own actions which 
prevented his attendance at trial. Id. at 642. "In such cases," 
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the court stated, "it is generally held that the defendant cannot 
bv his voluntary act invalidate the proceedings." Id. (emphasis 
added). The court further stated: "It may be fairly said that 
defendant has invited error by indulging in a conscious, 
deliberate act of absconding, which cannot be a basis for a 
reversal." Id. 
In Cleff v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1991), the defendant absconded from the jurisdiction following 
conviction on a ten-count charge after learning from his counsel 
that the jail term was likely to be thirty-five years. The 
defendant failed to appear for the sentencing. Later he 
petitioned to file a belated praecipe, a procedural requirement 
for filing an appeal. The trial court denied the petition. The 
defendant appealed claiming the trial court erred in holding that 
he had waived his right to appeal by remaining absent from the 
sentencing hearing where his appeal rights would have been 
provided. 
In rejecting Cleff's claim, the Indiana Court of 
Appeals held that even though the Indiana Constitution gave a 
criminal defendant an absolute right to appeal, Cleffs escape 
was a voluntary act which resulted in his failure to file a 
motion to correct errors or a praecipe within the statutorily 
required period and that he had thereby voluntarily and knowingly 
waived his absolute right to appeal. Cleff, 565 N.E.2d at 
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1092.3 Compare State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704-05 (Utah 1985) 
(allowing reinstatement of an existing appeal, dismissed after 
defendant escaped the jurisdiction, on the grounds that the 
escape did not establish an intent to abandon the appeal and that 
failure to reinstate the appeal would constitute punishment 
irrelevant to the offense of escape). 
In this case defendant clearly refused to cooperate 
with counsel from the outset, resulting in counsel's withdrawal. 
The withdrawal requests of both defendant's attorneys, filed in 
late October, 1992, attest to defendant's being informed that he 
was responsible for appearing personally or through counsel at 
trial beginning December 21 (R. 51, 87). At least one of these 
notices was mailed to defendant (R. 52). Defendant failed to 
appear at the December 4th scheduling conference after being 
twice noticed at least one week prior to the conference. Both 
3
 At first blush State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985), 
might appear contrary to Cleff, and relevant to this case. In 
Tuttle, the defendant was convicted, sentenced and committed. He 
then filed an appeal and later escaped. When he was returned to 
custody, his appeal was dismissed. The supreme court reinstated 
the appeal, rejecting the questionable assumption made in State 
v. Brady, 655 P.2d 1132 (1982), that one who escapes has actually 
made a decision to abandon his appeal, and noting that "[a] far 
more reasonable assumption is that the escapee has not even 
considered how his escape will affect his appeal rights." 
Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704. In support of its holding, the court 
noted that dismissing the defendant's appeal would be double 
punishment for the separate offense of escape. Id. at 704-05. 
Tuttle is distinguishable from this case. Defendant's 
total disregard of the proceedings, especially given his 
awareness that he would have to personally appear since he was no 
longer represented by counsel, evidence a complete disinterest in 
the outcome of the trial and sentencing. Further, dismissing 
this appeal would be precisely the appropriate action in response 
to defendant's total disregaird of his interests. 
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notices specifically required defendant's appearance (R. 44-45, 
46). Defendant was sent one notice of the December 21st trial on 
December 8. That notice informed defendant that his presence at 
trial was required (R. 41-42). Two more notices of trial, one of 
which ordered his presence, were sent on December 17 (R. 3 0-31, 
32-34) . Defendant failed to appear at trial (R. 27). 
Defendant was also informed of the January 22, 1993 
sentencing hearing through notices, requiring his presence, sent 
on January 6 and January 11 (the latter noticing forfeiture 
proceeding on January 22) and through mailing of the judgment on 
January 19, also requiring defendant's presence (R. 18-19). 
Defendant failed to appear at the sentencing (R. 17). 
A notice of a February 19, 1994 bail hearing, requiring 
defendant's presence, was sent to defendant on February 11 (R. 
13-14). Defendant did not appear at the hearing, and the trial 
court issued a bench warrant, notice of which was also mailed to 
defendant (R. 10-11, 12, 181). 
Every notice sent to defendant was mailed to the same 
address. At both the trial and the sentencing, the prosecutor 
stated that none of the notices had been returned (TT. 4-5; ST. 
3). The record does not indicate that any notices sent to 
defendant were returned. 
Defendant only made his first appearance in court at 
the sentence modification hearing on July 15, 1993, more than 
seven months after his counsel had withdrawn and his first 
appearance at a scheduling conference was required. The facts 
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demonstrate that defendant flouted the authority of the court by 
absenting himself from the proceedings in the face of repeated 
notice requiring his presence in court. Such conduct, in 
refusing to make any appearance in the proceedings, either 
personally or through counsel, also shows that defendant 
voluntarily abandoned any interest in their outcome. 
Rule 22(c) contemplates that the trial court will 
inform a defendant of his appeal rights at the time of 
sentencing. As in Cleff, the rule does not contemplate that in 
order to provide a defendant his rights, a trial court is 
required to chase a defendant who has voluntarily and generally 
disregarded the court's authority and specifically absented 
himself from the very proceeding in which he would have received 
notice of his appeal rights. This conclusion is supported by 
rule 22(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that 
a defendant may be sentenced in his absence and that "[i]f a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for his arrest 
may be issued by the court." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(b). The rule 
does not assign to the trial court the further duty of locating 
an absent defendant to inform him of his appeal rights. 
By analogy, Ross and Mvers also support this 
conclusion. Both Ross and Mvers argue that such conduct amounts 
to invited error, which render a defendant's claims unassertable. 
See also State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah App. 1991) 
(noting that the invited error doctrine prohibits a party from 
setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal 
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and, therefore, refusing to even consider the correctness of a 
jury instruction submitted by defendant as manifestly unjust 
because defendant had invited the error); State v. Bullock, 791 
P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989) (refusing to consider the 
defendant's conscious choice not to object to expert testimony 
under the plain error doctrine because, if the challenged 
evidence were then admitted, the supreme court "would be 
sanctioning a procedure that fosters invited error"). Similarly, 
this Court should refuse to consider the merits of defendant's 
claim because defendant's voluntary conduct prevented the court 
from fulfilling its obligations under the rules of court. 
2. In All Cases Cited by Defendant 
The Appellants Were Present at 
Sentencing. 
Defendant cites a number of cases in which the 
appellants' appeals, generally dismissed for untimeliness, were 
effectively reinstated or remanded to the lower courts with 
directions to resentence. Appellant's Br. at 5-7. Not one of 
these cases involves an appellant who intentionally absented 
himself from the sentencing hearing in defiance of notices and 
orders that he appear. Rather, in each case, it is evident that 
the appellant appeared at the sentencing hearing, generally with 
counsel, and the trial court failed to inform the appellant of 
his right to appeal. See Kirk v. United States, 447 F.2d 749, 
750 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Benthien, 434 F.2d 1031, 
1032 (1st Cir. 1970); Nance v. United States, 422 F.2d 590, 592 
(7th Cir. 1970); Paige v. United States, 443 F.2d 781, 781 (4th 
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Cir. 1971); United States v. Butler, 938 F.2d 702, 703 (6th Cir. 
1991); Hannigan v. United States, 341 F.2d 587, 588 (10th Cir. 
1965); State v. Mitchell, 642 P.2d 981, 983 (Kan. 1982); Bovd v. 
State, 282 A.2d 169, 170 (Me. 1971); State v. Fletcher, 417 A.2d 
106, 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); and State v. Carmodv, 
243 N.W.2d 348, 349 (N.D. 1976). 
Because authority cited by defendant discusses the 
trial court's duty to inform a defendant of his right to appeal 
in circumstances radically different from those in this case, it 
is not helpful to the resolution of the issue on appeal. 
3. Federal Authority, Cited by-
Defendant, Applies a Different 
Standard Than That Used in Utah. 
Defendant's authority also applies a far more demanding 
standard to the trial court's duty to inform defendant of his 
right to appeal than Utah requires. 
Rule 32(a) (2), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
provides that after the trial court imposes sentence it "shall" 
advise the defendant of his appeal rights, including the right to 
appeal in forma pauperis. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(2). The 
language of the federal rule has been generally strictly 
interpreted by federal circuit courts of appeal. Applying the 
rule, the court in Kirk presumed that the defendant had not 
voluntarily abandoned his appeal when he did nothing further 
after first filing it, and reversed the denial of the defendant's 
petition for post-conviction relief. Kirk, 447 F.2d at 751. 
Similarly, in Benthien, the court held that, even though the 
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petitioner's counsel informed the petitioner that he could 
appeal, the order dismissing the petition must be vacated because 
the trial court had not strictly complied with the rule requiring 
the trial court to inform the defendant of his right to appeal. 
Benthien, 434 F.2d at 1032. See also Nance, 422 F.2d at 591-92 
(the defendant may have been deprived of right of appeal because 
unsure whether he had rights in forma pauperis, even though he 
knew he could appeal). Effectively, defendant's cited authority 
requires per se reversal for failure to strictly comply with the 
governing rule. 
The standard is not so high in Utah. In State v. 
Crowe, 649 P.2d 2 (Utah 1982) (per curiam), the trial court 
advised the defendant of his right to appeal after the jury 
returned its verdict, but did not do so at the time of 
sentencing. Noting that defendant had a constitutional right of 
appeal, the supreme court held that the rule violation was 
harmless. Id. at 2. See also United States v. Drummond, 903 
F.2d 1171, 1174-75 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting approach of per se 
reversal for technical violation of rule 32(a)(2) and finding 
harmless the trial court's failure to inform the defendant of his 
right of appeal where counsel had done so). 
The State asserts that there is no trial court error 
because defendant never gave the court the opportunity to inform 
him of his right of appeal and thereby waived the right. 
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However, even if there were error it would be harmless.4 The 
only substantive claim of error on appeal is that defendant was 
denied his right to assistance of counsel, a right which he did 
not waive. Appellant's Br. at Point II. However, as argued 
below, that claim is totally without merit because the record 
amply shows that, through notice, defendant was aware that 
counsel would not be representing him at trial and that in the 
absence of counsel he knew he would be responsible for appearing 
himself. Appellee's Br. at Point III. Thus, even if defendant 
has preserved his right of appeal, he is not entitled to a 
reversal of his conviction. 
4. A Trial Court's Failure to 
Inform A Defendant of His Right of 
Appeal Does Not Extend the Time 
For Filing the Notice of Appeal. 
Defendant cites Boyd and Fletcher for the proposition 
that the time for taking an appeal does not begin to run until 
the defendant has been advised of his right of appeal. 
Appellant's Br. at 6-7. In each case, where the lower court had 
failed to inform the defendant of his right of appeal, the 
defendant's out-of-time appeal was reinstated. Boyd, 282 A.2d at 
170-73; Fletcher, 417 A.2d at 109. In so ruling, Boyd and 
4
 In all criminal prosecutions a defendant has a 
constitutional right to appeal. Utah Const, art I, § 12; Boggess 
v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1981). The standard applied to 
evaluating a state constitutional error is uncertain. See State 
v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 106 n.12 (Utah 1988) ("And this Court has 
never squarely decided whether violations of the Utah 
Constitution must be addressed under the federal constitutional 
standard of "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" or the lesser 
"erosion of confidence" standard of rule 3 0 we employ in 
analyzing state law issues of nonconstitutional dimensions.") 
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Fletcher effect ively held that the jurisdictional period for 
filing an appeal could be extended beyond the statutorily 
required period. 
In Utah the 3 0-day period for filing a notice of appeal 
in a criminal case is begins with the entry of the judgment 
appealed from. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). This requirement is 
jurisdictional and cannot be enlarged by an appellate court. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37. Also, the appellate rules do not allow 
the Court to enlarge the period within which an appeal may be 
taken. See Utah R. App. P. 2 (preventing the appellate court 
from suspending the 3 0-day filing requirement of rule 4(a)). 
Further, only the trial court may extend the time for filing the 
notice of appeal, and then only for thirty days. Utah R. App. P. 
4(e). 
As argued at Point I of this brief, defendant'a appeal 
is out-of-time and must be dismissed. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant claims that he was denied his constitutional 
right to assistance of counsel because his trial proceeded 
without him and without defense counsel and that there is no 
evidence that he waived his right. However, as noted Ross, a 
defendant who is voluntarily absent "cannot by his voluntary act 
invalidate the proceedings." State v. Ross, 655 P.2d at 642 
(quoting State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052, 1055 (Utah 1935)). This 
"invited error doctrine" functions to prevent a party from 
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"setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on 
appeal." Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205. See also Mvers, 29 Utah 2d 
at 303, 508 P.2d at 1179 (finding that the defendant could not 
complain that he was not represented by counsel at part of the 
trial when he "flouted the authority of the court by his 
absence," and finding that the defendant's claim opened the door 
to "invited error"). 
Like Myers, defendant cannot "flout the authority of 
the court" by voluntarily failing to appear for trial and 
sentencing, knowing that counsel had withdrawn and knowing that 
he was therefore expected to appear, and then claim he was denied 
assistance of counsel. According to Utah case law, a defendant 
is voluntarily absent from trial if he "knew or should have known 
of the pending trial." State v. Wacrstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 990 
(Utah App. 1989) . The record shows that defendant, who was out 
of custody on bail, was adequately notified of his trial and 
sentencing dates. Thus, defendant was voluntarily absent from 
his trial. 
In arguing that he was denied assistance of counsel, 
defendant relies solely on Wacrstaff v. Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah 
App. 1990) ("Waastaff"). In Wacrstaff, the issue was whether the 
defendant had waived his right to counsel. 
"The right to assistance of counsel . . . may be waived 
by a competent accused if the waiver is 'knowingly and 
intelligently' made." State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 
1987) (citations omitted). "Courts indulge every reasonable 
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presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." 
Waastaff, 802 P.2d at 778 (citations omitted). "The record must 
show . . . that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently 
and understandingly rejected the offer." State v. Hamilton, 732 
P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1986) (citations omitted).5 "When reviewing 
the record, this court must consider 'the total circumstances of 
the individual case including background, experience and the 
conduct of the accused/" State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 639 
(Utah App. 1993) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. 
Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 733 (Utah App. 1991)) (emphasis added). 
In Waastaff, the defendant's counsel, Olson, filed a 
motion to withdraw, which was granted. The record was unclear 
whether the defendant received notice of the withdrawal. At a 
5
 In Waastaff, this Court noted that trial courts 
traditionally ascertained whether an accused had knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel through colloquy 
between the court and the accused. Waastaff, 802 P.2d at 778. 
The Court cited Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 
S. Ct. 316, 323 (1948), for the probing investigation required of 
the trial court in determining the validity of a purported waiver 
of trial counsel. Id. 
In Von Moltke, the defendant was charged with espionage 
and subject to the death penalty. She was held incommunicado for 
almost one month before a lawyer, casually plucked from among 
lawyers who happened to be in the courtroom on other business, 
was appointed to represent her for two or three minutes at the 
arraignment. The district court never appointed another lawyer 
to represent the defendant in the plea proceedings, as promised. 
Id. 332 U.S. at 716-17, 68 S. Ct. at 320. When the defendant 
perfunctorily pleaded guilty by signing a waiver of counsel form, 
the trial court did not ask whether she understood the 
implications of the indictment, the consequences of her plea or 
the possible imposition of the death penalty. Id. 
Obviously, the trial court in this case could not 
engage in the colloquy required by the Supreme Court in Von 
Moltke because defendant refused to appear in court. 
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hearing held for the limited purpose of determining whether the 
defendant knew of the trial date, Olson could not recall whether 
he informed the defendant of the trial date. Olson also could 
not recall instructing the defendant to remain in contact or 
warning him that his failure to remain in contact could be 
construed as a waiver of his right to assistance of counsel. 
Waastaff, 802 P.2d at 777. Neither the defendant nor counsel 
appeared at trial, and the defendant was convicted in absentia. 
On these facts the Utah Court of Appeals found that !l[t]he record 
is unclear whether Wagstaff received notice of [counsel's] 
withdrawal." Id. at 777. The court concluded that Wagstaff's 
"voluntary absence from trial, in and of itself, was not a waiver 
of his right to counsel and that there is no further evidence in 
the record" that "might reasonably be construed as waiver." Id. 
at 779. 
Wagstaff is factually distinguishable from this case. 
The record shows that long before trial notice was sent to 
defendant informing him of at: least Florence's request to 
withdraw from representation (R. 52). Defendant correctly notes 
that Huntsman's notice was not sent to defendant. Appellant's 
Br. at 8 n.3. However, eight days after Florence filed his 
motion to withdraw, the prosecutor sent defendant a notice to 
substitute counsel in both cases within twenty days, since both 
his attorneys had withdrawn (R. 48-49). Florence's motion to 
withdraw, as well as Huntsman's, stated that defendant understood 
he must appear at trial, alone or with new counsel. Thereafter, 
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the prosecutor sent at least four notices and orders informing 
defendant of the scheduling conference and the trial. 
The only reasonable inference from this record is that 
defendant ignored these notices and chose not to retain counsel, 
not to attend trial, and not to stay in contact with the trial 
court. Now, after having failed to retain counsel and to appear 
at trial and sentencing, defendant cannot claim that his conduct 
does not constitute a waiver of counsel or that the error which 
he set up is a basis for appeal. To find for defendant would be 
to allow a "mischievously inclined defendant to profit by his own 
wrongdoing." State v. Myers, 29 Utah 2d 254, 256, 508 P.2d 41, 
42 (Utah 1973). 
Thus, this Court should decline to consider the merits 
of defendant's claim because to do so would sanction a procedure 
that invites error. However, if it does reach the merits, it 
should find that defendant voluntarily waived his constitutional 
right to counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions 
should be affirmed. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this '2* day of August, 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
' KENNETH BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Utah Rules o£ Criminal Procedure 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant 
may be tried in his absence, he may likewise 
be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant 
fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for 
his arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or 
plea of no contest, the court shall impose 
sentence and shall enter a judgment of 
conviction which shall include the plea or 
the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
Following imposition of sentence, the court 
shall advise the defendant of his right to 
appeal and the time within which any appeal 
shall be filed. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 2. Suspension of rules. 
In the interest of expediting a decision, 
the appellate court, on its own motion or for 
extraordinary cause shown, may, except as to 
the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 
5(a), and 48, suspend the requirements or 
provisions of any of these rules in a 
particular case and may order proceedings in 
that case in accordance with its direction. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as 
a matter of right from the trial court to the 
appellate court, the notice of appeal 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within 30 days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. However, when a judgment or 
order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice 
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 
days after the date of entry of the judgment 
or'order appealed from. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial 
court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
good cause, may extend the time for filing a 
notice of appeal upon motion filed not later 
than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A 
motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the 
trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a 
motion filed after expiration of the 
prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties in accordance with the rules of 
practice of the trial court. No extension 
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time 
or 10 days from the date of entry of the 
order granting the motion, whichever occurs 
later. 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
B u I e S ! Sentence and Judgment 
(a) Sentence. 
It) Notification of Right to Appeal After imposing sentence in a case which 
has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advisl the defendant of the 
defendant's right to appeal, including any right to appeal the sentence, and of the 
right of a person who in unable to pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to 
appeal in fonna pauperis. There shall be no duty on the eourt to advise the 
defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere, except that the court shall advise the defendant of any right to 
appeal the sentence, If the defendant so requests, the derk of the court shall 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
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vs. 









MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
AS COUNSEL 
Case No. 91-CR-0071 
Case No. 921600003 
Hon. David L. Mower 
Comes now Brian R. Florence, Attorney at Law, and 
hereby moves the Court for permission to withdraw as counsel 
for the above-named defendant's cases. This Motion is made 
upon the grounds and for the reasons that the defendant has 
indicated that he is unwilling to pay the necessary attorney 
fee to try his cases. 
A Motion to Suppress is pending before the Court as is 
a Motion to Consolidate. One of the cases designated above 
is scheduled for trial on December 21-23, 1992. The trial on 









IN, UTAH 84401 
STATE v. LEWIS 
Case No. 91-CR-0071 
Case No. 921600003 
Motion to Withdraw 
Page No. 2 
on the Motions referred to above. If the Motion to Suppress 
is granted, this Motion to Withdraw would be considered moot. 
If the Motion to Suppress is denied and the Motion to 
Consolidated granted, presumably the matter would be 
continued to a later date to permit sufficient time to try 
the facts in both cases, in which event no party would be 
prejudiced by granting the undersigned's request to withdraw. 
The defendant is aware that the undersigned intends to 
make this request and that he would be responsible for 
appearing with counsel or by himself at any future trial 
setting. . 
rffL 
DATED this /.) — day of October, 1992. 
NCE AND HUTCHISON 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney at Law 
818-26th Street 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, postage 
prepaid, to the following at the addresses listed on this 
j& day of October, 1992, 
Donald E. Lewis 
Defendant 
71 Fairhope Circle 
Arab, AL 35016 
James R. Scarth 
Deputy Kane County Attorney 
76 North Main 
Kanab, UT 84741 
R'. Clayton Huntsman 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1425 
St. George, UT 84771 
I^LEEti^ HRISTEN&fi*^ ?, Secretary 
& 
ORIGINAL 
R. CLAYTON HUNTSMAN-1600 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 West St. George Boulevard 
Ancestor Square Tower Building - Suite 31 
P.O. Box 1425 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Tel: (801) 628-2846 
«ANE COUNTV 
NM t 2 
^^HOlSTft/CT^oT^"-* 
IN AND FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD E. LEWIS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
AUTHORIZING WITHDRAWAL 
OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 91-Cr-0071 
Comes now R. Clayton Huntsman, co-counsel of record for 
Defendant Donald E. Lewis, and respectfully moves the Court for 
permission to withdraw as counsel for said defendant. 
This motion is made for the following reasons: 
1. Defendant has indicated that he is unwilling to pay the 
necessary attorney fee to try this case and its potentially joined 




2. Defendant has otherwise not cooperated with counsel, 
making counselvs attempt to adequately defend much more difficult 
and essentially impractical. 
3. Other good and compelling case which counsel is unable to 
disclose to this Court justifies this motion. 
4. It appears that the trial date of December 21-23, 1992, is 
impractical to try both cases, in which case no party would be 
prejudiced by granting undersigned1s request to withdraw. 
5. Defendant has been advised often over the past year of 
this request and understands that he is responsible for appearing 
at any future trial setting, with or without new counsel. 
6. Other good cause appears in support of this Motion. 
7. This motion is made pursuant to Rule permitting ruling 
without hearing. 
DATED this £/ day of 
Attorney/for Defendant 
I do not oppose this motion: 
~"^-Ji^ Scarth 
Kane County Attorney 
<6 i 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on the PJ day of C^ycf^U-*
 f 
1992, I nailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR 
ORDER AUTHORIZING WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL, postage pre-paid by 
depositing same in the United States Mail, to the following, to 
wit: 
Jin Scarth 
Kane County Attorney 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Brian R. Florence 
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON 
Attorney at Law 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
$ & 
ADDENDUM C 
Jim R. Scarth #2870 
Kane County Attorney 
Kane County Courthouse 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone (801) 644-2458, Facsimile (801) 644-2096 
STATE OF UTAH, NOTICE TO SUBSTITUTE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD E. LEWIS, 
Defendant. 
| COUNSEL 
Case No. 921600003 
91-CR-0071 
TO: DONALD E. LEWIS 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendant's attorneys having 
withdrawn, you are hereby given notice to substitute counsel in 
the above captioned cases within TWENTY (20) days. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on thisCy^r*1 day of October, 1992, 
mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above foregoing 
Notice with first class postage, to: Donald E. Lewis, 71 




Jim R. Scarth #2870 
Kane County Attorney 
Kane County Courthouse 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone 801-644-5278 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278, Facsimile (801) 644-2096 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
DONALD E. LEWIS, J 
Defendant. 
| O R D E R 
CASE NO. 921600003 
> 91-CR-0071 
The above captioned matter came on regularly for a hearing 
on Friday the 20th day of November, 1992 at Kanab, Utah. The 
Plaintiff was present and was represented by the Kane County 
Attorney. The Defendant was not present however, his counsel of 
record R. Clayton Huntsman was present. A Motion to Withdraw as 
counsel was filed by Brian Florence and R. Clayton Huntsman. A 
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The Court having heard arguments reveiwed the files and 
records herein and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby 
Ordered as follows: 
The motions to withdraw as counsel for Defendant are hereby 
granted. 
The motion to consolidate is hereby granted and this case 
is hereby consolidated for trial with Kane County District Court 
case number 91-CR-0071 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above named Defendant is to 
appear in person at the above entitled Court on Friday the 4th 
day of December, 1992, at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs for a scheduling conference. In the event the Defendant 
fails to appear in person on or before said date and request a 
jury trial, this matter will be set for non jury trial to 
commence at 9:00 a.m. on December 21, 1992. 
DATED this / H day of December, 1992. 
3^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this If day of December, 1992, 
I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above foregoing 
Order, with first class postage, to: R. Clayton Huntsman, P.O. 
Box 1425, St. George, Utah, Brain Florence, 818 26th Street, 
Ogden, Utah 84401, Donald Lewis, 71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab, AL. 
35016. 
WlQi/iicg Ghapt f> 
& 
ADDENDUM E 
Jim R. Scarth #2870 
Kane County Attorney 
Kane County Courthouse 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone (801) 644-2458, Facsimile (801) 644-2096 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
DONALD E. LEWIS ] 
Defendant. ] 
NOTICE OF SCHEDULING 
) CONFERENCE 
CASE NO. 921600003 
TO: DONALD E. LEWIS 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been 
set for scheduling before the Honorable DON V. TIBBS Judge of the 
District Court, County of Kane, State of Utah, in the District 
Courtroom of the Kane County Courthouse, at Kanab, Utah, on 
Friday the 4th day of December 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
You must appear in person before the above entitled Court 
at said place, date and time. 
Please be advised that the Court has scheduled a non-jury 
trial in this case and if you desire a jury trial you must 
request the same on or before December 4, 1992. 
44 
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PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDING. 
F2. 
jrUXaKOL* V3UVLIUM X U U . K O . D l j r Hl~V~U.K.iJJLIMl?. 
DATED this jZ5 day of November, 
"^\J*M R. SCARTH 
Kane County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this C/S day of If J Oi^flyJhiL , 
1992, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing NOTICE OF SCHEDULING, with first-class postage thereon 
fully prepaid to: Donald Lewis, 71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab, 
Alabama, 35016 R. Clayton Huntsman, P.O. Box 1425, St. Goerge, 
Utah 84770 Brain Florence, 818 26th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401, 
A If A , M flit J 
^ 
ADDENDUM F 
Jim R. Scarth #2870 
Kane County Attorney 
Kane County Courthouse 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone (801) 644-2458, Facsimile (801) 644-2096 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
DONALD E. LEWIS ] 
Defendant. 
NOTICE NON-JURY TRIAL 
CASE NO. 921600003 
TO; DONALD E. LEWIS 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been 
set for non-jury trial before the Honorable DON V. TIBBS Judge of 
the District Court, County of Kane# State of Utah, in the 
District Courtroom of the Kane County Courthouse, at Kanab, Utah, 
on Monday the 21st day of December 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
You must appear in person before the above entitled Court 
at said place, date and time. 
4-1 
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PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDING. 
DATED this Jr day of December, 1^32; 
"^^V^alM R~ SCARTH 
Kane County Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this ffi^ day of \^/SCJllOdDfAj 
1992, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing NOTICE OF NON-JURY TRIAL, with first-class postage 
thereon fully prepaid to: Donald Lewis, 71 Fair Hope Circle, 































21ST DECEMBER 1992 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Today is 
December 21st, 1992. It's about 9:30 in the morning by the 
clock on the wall. Mr. Scarth is here and I have two files 
that name Donald Leu/is. 
No one is sitting at defense table, and I assume 
Mr. Lewis is not here. Would you know him by sight, Mr. 
Scarth? 
MR. SCARTH: I've never seen him. 
Your Honor, there's so many witness here he has. 
He doesn't appear to have been here as of yet, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. What's your desire, Mr. 
Scarth? 
STATE'S MOTION TO TRY CASE IN ABSENCE OF DEFENDANT 
MR. SCARTH: The State would move the Court to be 
allowed to try this case in absence of the defendant. 
THE COURT: When we look at the file; I think 
there have been notices sent to him and his lawyers and I 
think you've sent most of those, haven't you? 
MR. SCARTH: Yeah. I don't mean to be facetious, 
but for months we've been sending notices of the trial on 
this dayt orginally that it would be a jury trial on this 



























THE COURT: None of those ever came back from the 
Post Office? 
MR. SCARTH: None have ever been returned. 
THE COURT: But you've never had any affirmative 
reaction from Mr. Leu/is that he ever got anything from you. 
MR. SCARTH: That's right. I've sent him not 
only notices of the trial, but notice of the substitute 
counsel, various orders prior to being signed, for his 
review, after being signed by the Court. We've sent him 
copies. We've received no reaction from him since—well, 
I've never heard from Mr. Lewis, ever. Neither has anyone 
on my staff. 
THE COURT: He had two lawyers at one time and 
they both sent him a notice to appoint counsel. 
MR. SCARTH: Correct. 
Through his attorneys, of course, I've heard from 
him. But only through his former attorneys. They've now 
both withdrawn. These cases have been consolidated. Did 
the Court read the numbers into the record? I don't 
remember. 
THE COURT: No, I didn't. And I should do that. 
The older number—the older case is 91CR0071, and the 
newer case is 921600003. 



























was ever arraigned; and since the State1s moving to be 
allowed to proceed in his absence, I frankly don't know how 
to handle that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know whether he has 
either, except there was an entry of a not guilty plea in 
writing by one of—by his former lawyer. 
MR. SCARTH: The attorneys have appeared for him 
and have entered a not guilty plea, so I guess he has been 
arraigned. 
THE COURT: I think he has been. 
Well, I'm satisfied that Mr. Lewis knows about 
these proceedings today and has voluntarily chosen not to 
appear and the motion, by the State, to proceed in the 
absense of Mr. Lewis is granted; 
And you have witnesses here and you're prepared 
to proceed. 
MR. SCARTH: That's correct. 
THE COURT: How many witnesses, do you think? 
MR. SCARTH: I haven't counted. I think there1s 
seven. 
THE COURT: Okay. I looked at therfiles this 
morning and was looking for informations and Ifm wondering 
about how many different charges. 
MR. SCARTH: There are eight counts, Your Honor, 





Jim R. Scarth #2870 "^^—~ir/<L-,? ^ 
Kane County Attorney *'Y7.-.: Ji^\j 
Kane County Courthouse " ~ -/" ^~:'-u 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone 801-644-5278 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278, Facsimile (801) 644-2096 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD E. LEWIS, 
Defendant. 
5UBGMENT-
CASE NO. 91-CR-0071 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for non-jury 
trial before the above entitled Court on Monday the 21st day of 
December, 1992, at Kanab, Utah. The Plaintiff was present and 
was represented by the Kane County Attorney. The Defendant 
failed to appear either in person or by an attorney. The State 
moved the Court to proceed to trial in Defendants absence. Said 
motion was granted. The State called witnesses to testify and 
exhibits were entered and received into evidence. 
iB 
State vs. Lewis 
Judgment 
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The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses and 
having considered the evidence found from the same that the 
Defendant is guilty, as charged, beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
offenses of Count I, II, UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PROTECTED WILDLIFE, a 
class A misdemeanor, Count III, IV, WASTE OF PROTECTED WILDLIFE, 
a class B misdemeanor, Count V, VI, AIDING AND ASSISTING IN 
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF PROTECTED WILDLIFE, a class A misdemeanor, 
and Count VII, VIII, AIDING AND ASSISTING IN THE WASTE OF 
PROTECTED WILDLIFE, a class B misdemeanor. 
Sentencing in this matter will commence on January 22, 1993 
at 9:00 a.m. at Kanab, Utah. The Defendant's presence at 
sentencing is required. 
DATED this day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAHXB'L. MOWER 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this / *?*fr- day of January, 
1993, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above 
foregoing Judgment with first-class postage, to: Donald E. 




Jim R. Scarth #2870 
Kane County Attorney 
Kane County Courthouse 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278 
.tf& ITU i^M\ 
SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone (801) 644-2458, Facsimile (801) 644-2096 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD E. LEWIS 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF SENTENCING 
CASE NO. 91-CR-0071 
TO: DONALD LEWIS 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled case has been 
set for sentencing before the Honorable DAVID L. MOWER Judge of 
the District Court, County of Kane, State of Utah, in the 
District Courtroom of the Kane County Courthouse, at Kanab, Utah, 
on Friday the 22nd day of January 1993, at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
Your presence is required. 
PLEASE GOVERN .VOURSELF ACCORDING. 
DATED this _j£_ aay of January 1993, 
NJST JJft R. SCARTH 
Kane County Attorney 
^ 
State vs. Lewis 
Notice 
Case No. 91-CR-0071 
Page 2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this \P^ day ofsJfliJAA>fll !u L . 
1992, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing NOTICE OF SENTENCING, with first-class postage thereon 
































22ND JANUARY 1993 
SENTENCING 
THE COURT: State vs. Donald E. Lewis. Today's 
the date for sentencing. 
I see an officer from Wildlife Resources coming 
to sit with Mr. Scarth. I don't see anybody else 
responding. 
Donald E. Lewis, with you are you here? 
[NO RESPONSE] 
Mr. Lewis was previously convicted at a trial 
that was held in his absencer but he received notice, in my 
opinion. He was convicted of two Class-A Misdemeanors—six 
Class-B Misdemeanors. Any reason not to have the sentencing 
hearing nowr Mr. Scarth? 
MR. SCARTH: Noner Your Honor. I believe the 
defendant has received adequate notice. My office mailed 
him notice some time back. 
The judgment itself, which was dated by this 
Court on the 14th of January, 1993f the last sentence says 
"Sentencing in this matter will commence on January 22nd, 
1993f at 9:00 a.m. in Kanabf Utah. The defendant's presence 
at sentencing is required.M 
Now that wasn't mailed to Mr. Lewis until the 
19th day of January, 1993; however, prior to mailing it to 



























saying is five days prior to that, we mailed Mr. Lewis a 
letter with a proposed order, telling him if he had any 
objections, let me know in five days. I never heard from 
him. 
It was also in about that same time frame that we 
sent him a notice to appear here—specifically to appear for 
sentencing at this time, place, and date. 
THE COURT: It's the same address that you've 
sent other papers to. 
MR. SCARTH: That's correct. And nothing's come 
back undelivered. 
THE COURT: Today's the day for sentencing. I 
don't see a reason not to hold a sentencing hearing. 
What penalty should I impose, Mr. Scarth? 
PLAINTIFF'S RECOMMENDATION 
MR. SCARTH: Your Honor, you have eight charges 
before you for which he's been convicted. 
THE COURT: Two Class-A's— 
MR. SCARTH: No. You have four Class-A's and 
four Class-B's. 
THE COURT: In the order that I signed on January 
14th, it refers to two Class-A's, Counts 1 and 2. 
MR. SCARTH: Yeah. And then read on further and 
you'll see two more Class-A, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And then it says Counts 3 and 4, 
ADDENDUM K 
Jim R. Scarth #2870 
Kane County Attorney 
Kane County Courthouse 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone 801-644-5278 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
KANE COUNTY 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801) 644-5278, Facsimile (801) 644-2096 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
DONALD E. LEWIS, ] 
Defendant. ' 
| JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND 
AND ORDER OF FORFEITURE 
CASE NO. 91-CR-0071 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for sentencing 
before the above-entitled Court on Friday the 22nd day of 
January, 1993# at Kanab, Utah. The Plaintiff was present and was 
represented by the Kane County Attorney. The Defendant did not 
appear either in person or by counsel. 
SENTENCING 
IT IS THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT that for each of the four 
(4) class A misdemeanor the Defendant be confined and imprisoned 
in the Kane County Jail for a period of one (1) year for a total 
of four (4) years, and for each of the four (4) class B 
misdemeanors the Defendant be confined and imprisoned in the Kane 
County Jail for a period of six (6) months for a total of twenty 
four (24) months, all suspended except for two (2) years. 
State vs. Lewis 
Judgment 
Case No . 91-CR-0071 
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The Defendant is fined as follows: for each class A 
misdemeanor the amount of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($2,500.00), plus an 85% surcharge, and for each class B 
misdemeanor the amount of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00), plus 
an 85% surcharge for a total of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS ($25,900.00). 
It is further ordered that the Defendant pay restitution to 
the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources Help Stop Poaching Fund 




IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following items be forfeited 
to the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources. 
1. Remington 7mm mag model 700 with Redfield scope serial # 
A6764329 with beige gun case. 
2. Weatherby 270 mag with Redfield scope and bipod Serial # 
129743 with black guncase with bore sight sling. 
3. Remington 30.06 model 700 Serial # C6345364 with Bushnell 




State vs. Lewis 
Judgment 
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6. Bucksight knife 
7. Silver pocket knife 
8. Photo album containing pictures of unlawfully taken wildlife 
9. 6 VHS video tapes showing illegally taken wildlife 
10. Black vinyl brief case (and contents) containing notes of 
illegal activity and future illegal activity 
11. Thompson Center Arms .357 (Herret) handgun Serial # 228086 
with Tasco scope with detachable rifle stock. 
12. 1 pair blue trax sneakers 
13. 1 pair Browning Nomad boots 
14. 1988 Chevrolet pick up Alaska Plate 9217 CN Vin # 
IGCFK24HOJZ14334 
WARRANT 
The Court hereby authorizes the issuance of a no bond 
warrant. 
JURISDICTION 
The Court retains jurisdiction over all sentencing 
matters. 
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BAIL 
Bail in this matter will be forfeited to pay the 
restitution as well as the fines in this case. 
DATED this 1 1 day of ff'& , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ / 1
 ,•' /11 
DAVID L. MOWER 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this or? day ot^^/ft/MAdf 
1993, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above 
foregoing Judgment, with first-class postage, to: Donald Lewis, 
71 Fair Hope Circle, Arab, AL. 35016. 
Zfl.tkiLfklJ 
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